With the demand for knowledge-handling systems capable of dealing with and distinguishing between various facets of imprecision ever increasing, a clear and formal characterization of the mathematical models implementing such services is quintessential. In this paper, this task is undertaken simultaneously for the definition of implication within two settings: first, within intuitionistic fuzzy set theory and secondly, within interval-valued fuzzy set theory. By tracing these models back to the underlying lattice that they are defined on, on one hand we keep up with an important tradition of using algebraic structures for developing logical calculi (e.g. residuated lattices and MV algebras), and on the other hand we are able to expose in a clear manner the two modelsÕ formal equivalence. This equivalence, all too often neglected in literature, we exploit to construct operators extending the notions of classical and fuzzy implication on these structures; to initiate a meaningful classification framework for the resulting operators, based on logical and extra-logical criteria imposed on them; and finally, to re(de)fine the intuititive ideas giving rise to both approaches as models of imprecision and apply them in a practical context.
Introduction
Intuitionistic fuzzy sets [1] and interval-valued fuzzy sets ( [54, 67] and more recently, [58] ) are two intuitively straightforward extensions of ZadehÕs fuzzy sets [66] , that were conceived independently to alleviate some of the drawbacks of the latter. Henceforth, for notational ease, we abbreviate ''intuitionistic fuzzy set'' to IFS and ''interval-valued fuzzy set'' to IVFS. IFS theory basically defies the claim that from the fact that an element x ''belongs'' to a given degree (say l) to a fuzzy set A, naturally follows that x should ''not belong'' to A to the extent 1 À l, an assertion implicit in the concept of a fuzzy set. On the contrary, IFSs assign to each element of the universe both a degree of membership l and one of non-membership m such that l þ m 6 1, thus relaxing the enforced duality m ¼ 1 À l from fuzzy set theory. Obviously, when l þ m ¼ 1 for all elements of the universe, the traditional fuzzy set concept is recovered. IFSs owe their name [4] to the fact that this latter identity is weakened into an inequality, in other words: a denial of the law of the excluded middle occurs, one of the main ideas of intuitionism. 1 IVFS theory emerged from the observation that in a lot of cases, no objective procedure is available to select the crisp membership degrees of elements in a fuzzy set. It was suggested to alleviate that problem by allowing to specify only an interval [l 1 ; l 2 ] to which the actual membership degree is assumed to belong. A related approach, second-order fuzzy set theory, also introduced by Zadeh [67] , goes one step further by allowing the membership degrees themselves to be fuzzy sets in the unit interval; this extension is not considered in this paper.
Both approaches, IFS and IVFS theory, have the virtue of complementing fuzzy sets, that are able to model vagueness, with an ability to model uncertainty as well. 2 IVFSs reflect this uncertainty by the length of the interval membership degree [l 1 ; l 2 ], while in IFS theory for every membership degree ðl; mÞ, the value p ¼ 1 À l À m denotes a measure of non-determinacy (or undecidedness).
Each approach has given rise to an extensive literature covering their respective applications, but surprisingly very few people seem to be aware of their equivalence, stated first in [2] and later in [31, 63] . Indeed, take any IVFS A in a universe X , and assume that the membership degree of x in A is given as the interval [l 1 ; l 2 ]. Obviously, l 1 þ 1 À l 2 6 1, so by defining l ¼ l 1 and m ¼ 1 À l 2 we obtain a valid membership and non-membership degree for x in an IFS A 0 . Conversely, starting from any IFS A 0 we may associate to it an IVFS A by putting, for each element x, the membership degree of x in A equal to the interval [l; 1 À m] with again ðl; mÞ the pair of membership/non-membership degrees of x in A 0 . As a consequence, a considerable body of work has been duplicated by adepts of either theory, or worse, is known to one group and ignored by the other. Therefore, regardless of the meaning (semantics) that one likes his or her preferred approach to convey, it is worthwhile to develop the underlying theory in a framework as abstract and general as possible. Lattices seem to lend themselves extremely well to that purpose; indeed it is common practice to interpret them as evaluation sets from which truth values are drawn and to use them as a starting point for developing logical calculi. Let us apply this strategy to the formal treatment of IVFSs and IFSs: we will describe them as special instances of GoguenÕs L-fuzzy sets, 3 where the appropriate evaluation set will be the bounded lattice ðL Ã ; 6 L Ã Þ defined as [14] :
L Ã ¼ fðx 1 ; x 2 Þ 2 ½0; 1 2 j x 1 þ x 2 6 1g ðx 1 ; x 2 Þ 6 L Ã ðy 1 ; y 2 Þ ( ) x 1 6 y 1 and x 2 P y 2
The units of this lattice are denoted 0 L Ã ¼ ð0; 1Þ and 1 L Ã ¼ ð1; 0Þ. A special subset of L Ã , called the diagonal D, is defined by D ¼ fðx 1 ; x 2 Þ 2 ½0; 1 2 j x 1 þ x 2 ¼ 1g. The shaded area in Fig. 1 is the set of elements x ¼ ðx 1 ; x 2 Þ belonging to L Ã .
Note. This definition favours IFSs as they are readily seen to be L-fuzzy sets w.r.t. this lattice, while for IVFSs a transformation from ðx 1 ; x 2 Þ 2 L Ã to the interval [x 1 ; 1 À x 2 ] must be performed beforehand; this decision reflects the background of the authors. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that nothing stands in our way to define equivalently: L I ¼ fðx 1 ; x 2 Þ 2 ½0; 1 2 j x 1 6 x 2 g ðx 1 ; x 2 Þ 6 L I ðy 1 ; y 2 Þ ( ) x 1 6 y 1 and x 2 6 y 2 and develop the theory in terms of ðL I ; 6 L I Þ. For compliance with the existing literature, we denote the class of L Ã -fuzzy sets in a universe U by F L Ã ðU Þ. Note. In this paper, if x 2 L Ã , we refer to its and first and second components by x 1 and x 2 respectively. In case we want to refer to the individual components of an expression like f ðxÞ, where in this case for instance f is an L Ã ! L Ã mapping, we write pr 1 f ðxÞ and pr 2 f ðxÞ, where the projections pr 1 and pr 2 map an ordered pair (in this case an element of L Ã ) to its first and second component, respectively.
The lattice ðL Ã ; 6 L Ã Þ is a complete lattice: for each A L Ã , sup A ¼ ðsupfx 2 ½0; 1jð9y 2 ½0; 1Þððx; yÞ 2 AÞg; inffy 2 ½0; 1jð9x 2 ½0; 1Þððx; yÞ 2 AÞgÞ and inf A ¼ ðinffx 2 ½0; 1jð9y 2 ½0; 1Þððx; yÞ 2 AÞg; supfy 2 ½0; 1jð9x 2 ½0; 1Þ ððx; yÞ 2 AÞgÞ.
As is well known, every lattice ðL; 6 Þ has an equivalent definition as an algebraic structure ðL;^; _Þ where the meet operator^and the join operator _ are linked to the ordering 6 by the following equivalence, for a; b 2 L:
The operators^and _ on ðL Ã ; 6 L Ã Þ are defined as follows, for ðx 1 ; y 1 Þ; ðx 2 ; y 2 Þ 2 L Ã : This algebraic structure will be the basis for our subsequent investigations. In the next section, entitled ''Preliminaries'' the most important operations on ðL Ã ; 6 L Ã Þ are defined, notably: triangular norms and conorms, negators and implicators. They model the basic logical operations of conjunction, disjunction, negation and implication. Implicators on L Ã will be the main point of in- terest in the remainder of the paper: in Section 3 we review construction techniques for them, Section 4 examines their classification w.r.t. a number of criteria imposed on them while Section 5 embeds the results into the frameworks of well-known logical calculi such as residuated lattices and MV algebras. Section 6 then puts the focus back on the models that we started out with: IFSs and IVFSs, and describes their applicability in the field of approximate reasoning. Future opportunities and challenges are also discussed in that section.
Preliminaries
In the literature on IFSs and IVFSs, several methods for constructing connectives have emerged, their rationale typically based on specific considerations taken in the light of the actual framework for which they were developed. While most of them have the advantage of being readily understood by anyone familiar with that framework, they are not always the most general nor the most suitable ones that could be defined. Therefore, to put matters in as wide as possible a perspective, in this and the next section, we introduce logical connectives simply as algebraic mappings on L Ã , regardless of their interpretation in the context of a specific model. We recall the definitions of the main logical operations in ðL Ã ; 6 L Ã Þ, as well as some of the representation results established earlier and obtained in the framework of an extensive study on intuitionistic fuzzy triangular norms and conorms [27] [28] [29] .
Ã , will be called the standard negator. Involutive negators on L Ã can always be related to an involutive negator on ½0; 1, as the following theorem shows [29] . Theorem 1. Let N be an involutive negator on L Ã , and let the ½0; 1 ! ½0; 1 mapping N be defined by, for a 2 ½0; 1, N ðaÞ ¼ pr 1 Nða; 1 À aÞ. Then for all
Since 6 L Ã is a partial ordering, an order-theoretic definition of conjunction and disjunction on L Ã as triangular norms and conorms, t-norms and tconorms for short, respectively, arises quite naturally:
Obviously, the greatest t-norm with respect to the ordering 6 L Ã is Min, defined by Min ðx; yÞ ¼ x^y; the smallest t-conorm w.r.t. 6 L Ã is Max, defined by Max ðx; yÞ ¼ x _ y for all x; y 2 L Ã . Note that it does not hold that for all x; y 2 L Ã , either Min ðx; yÞ ¼ x or Min ðx; yÞ ¼ y. For instance, Min ðð0:1; 0:3Þ; ð0:2; 0:4ÞÞ ¼ ð0:1; 0:4Þ.
Involutive negators on L Ã are always linked to an associated fuzzy connective (a negator on ½0; 1); the same does not always hold true for t-norms and t-conorms, however. We therefore have to introduce the following definition [16] :
is called t-representable if there exists a t-norm T and a t-conorm S on ½0; 1 (respectively a t-conorm S 0 and a t-norm T 0 on ½0; 1) such that, for 
It is easily verified that they are t-conorms. The first one is t-representable with the probabilistic sum and algebraic product on ½0; 1 as representants. It is an extension of the probabilistic sum t-conorm to L Ã . The second one is not trepresentable, since its first component depends also on x 2 and y 2 . It is an extension of the max t-conorm to L Ã .
The theorem below states the conditions under which a pair of connectives on ½0; 1 gives rise to a t-representable t-norm (t-conorm) on L Ã .
Theorem 2 [16] . Given a t-norm T and t-conorm S on ½0; 1 satisfying T ða; bÞ 6 1 À Sð1 À a; 1 À bÞ for all a; b 2 ½0; 1, the mappings T and S defined by, for are a t-norm and a t-conorm on L Ã , respectively.
Note. The discovery of a mapping like S 2 , first mentioned in [16] , rules out the conjecture, implicit in most of the existing literature (see e.g. [7, 14, 35, 41] ), that interval-valued or intuitionistic fuzzy t-norms and t-conorms are necessarily characterized by a pair of fuzzy connectives on which some condition (cf. Theorem 2) is imposed to assure that the result of an operation belongs to the evaluation set. Moreover, as we shall see in Section 4, implicators based on trepresentable operators do not inherit as much of the desirable properties of their fuzzy counterparts as we would like them to, a defect that can be mended by considering non-t-representable extensions for the implicator construction.
The dual of a t-norm T on L Ã (t-conorm S) w.r.t. a negator N is the mapping T Ã (respectively S Ã ) defined by, for x; y 2 L Ã , T Ã ðx; yÞ ¼ NðTðNðxÞ; NðyÞÞÞ ðrespectively S Ã ðx; yÞ ¼ NðSðNðxÞ; NðyÞÞÞÞ
It can be verified that T Ã is a t-conorm and S Ã is a t-norm on L Ã . Moreover, the dual t-norm (t-conorm) with respect to an involutive negator N on L Ã of a t-representable t-conorm (t-norm) is t-representable [29] .
In [29] a representation theorem for t-norms on L Ã meeting a number of criteria was formulated and proven.
Ã Þ (x 1 6 ¼ 0 and x 2 6 ¼ 0 and y 1 6 ¼ 0 and y 2 6 ¼ 0 and Tðx; 
The list of imposed conditions on T seems overwhelming, but on closer inspection the relationship with the analogous result in fuzzy set theory (representation of continuous, archimedean, nilpotent t-norms on ½0; 1, see e.g. [46] ) becomes obvious, so it is justified to state that Theorem 3 constitutes a conservative extension of that result. A generalization of Theorem 3 can be found in [30] .
The final and for our present purposes most important construct is that of an implicator on L Ã . Our definition includes a very wide class of mappings on L Ã ; the task of classification (Section 3) will be to select from this class those implicators that are, in a way, the most appropriate ones.
Moreover we require I to be decreasing in its first, and increasing in its second component.
Construction of Implicators on L*
The purpose of this section is to give the reader some feeling for the sheer multitude of connectives that fit Definition 6, by providing a number of illustrative examples, and also to arm ourselves sufficiently well for the classification task that awaits us in the next section, by putting some structure into the class of implicators on L Ã : as a point of departure, we extend the common notions of S-and R-implicators from fuzzy set theory to L Ã [16, 27] , an approach that has the virtue of being the algebraically most straightforward and flexible one (w.r.t. classification). The story does not end there, however, as the eclectic literature on intuitionistic fuzzy and interval-valued connectives has bequeathed us with some operators outside the above-mentioned classes but in line with Definition 6 and with varying usefulness.
Strong implicators on L

Ã
Strong implicators, or shortly S-implicators, on the unit interval emerged by paraphrasing the equivalence between the formulas P ! Q and :P _ Q in binary propositional logic using a negator and a t-conorm. A straightforward extension to L Ã presents itself as follows:
. Let S be a t-conorm and N a negator on L Ã . The S-implicator generated by S and N is the mapping I S;N defined as, for x; y 2 L Ã :
It can be verified that the resulting construct satisfies Definition 6 regardless of N and S. Below we present some common examples of S-implicators on L Ã ; for every operator thus defined we also quote the corresponding connective on the unit interval that this implicator extends. Note especially how a single implicator on ½0; 1 gives way to several extensions, with--as will become clear in the next section--significantly differing properties. Example 4. Let Sðx; yÞ ¼ ðminð1;
I S W ;N s is another extension of the Łukasiewicz implicator on ½0; 1. It is also an example of a non-t-representable S-implicator.
Residual implicators on L
Ã
Another way of defining implication in classical logic is to consider the equivalence P ! Q supfX 2 f0; 1gjP^X 6 Qg and fuzzify it, using a t-norm, to obtain the definition of residual implicators on ½0; 1, or R-implicators for short.
The R-implicator generated by T is the mapping I T defined as, for x; y 2 L Ã :
Again, the above-defined mappings are implicators on L Ã in the sense of Definition 6. Some of them have occurred previously in literature; for instance, in [41] , Jenei already introduced the class of t-representable R-implicators on L Ã in the specific setting of IVFSs.
Due to the supremum operation appearing in their definition, it is not always straightforward to derive an explicit form for R-implicators on L Ã , as the examples below show.
Example 5. Let Tðx;yÞ¼Minðx;yÞ¼ðminðx 1 ;y 1 Þ;maxðx 2 ;y 2 ÞÞ for all x;y 2L Ã . Then
We now derive an explicit formula for I Min :
• If x 1 6 y 1 and x 2 P y 2 , then minðx 1 ; c 1 Þ 6 x 1 6 y 1 8c 1 2 ½0; 1 and maxðx 2 ; c 2 Þ P x 2 P y 2 8c 2 2 ½0; 1. Hence, in that case, I Min ðx; yÞ ¼ 1 L Ã .
• If x 1 6 y 1 and x 2 < y 2 , then still minðx 1 ; c 1 Þ 6 x 1 6 y 1 8c 1 2 ½0; 1, but maxðx 2 ; c 2 Þ P y 2 if and only if c 2 P y 2 , hence inffc 2 2 ½0; 1j maxðx 2 ; c 2 Þ P y 2 g ¼ y 2 . We conclude that I Min ðx; yÞ ¼ ð1 À y 2 ; y 2 Þ.
• If x 1 > y 1 and x 2 P y 2 , then still maxðx 2 ; c 2 Þ P x 2 P y 2 8c 2 2 ½0; 1, but minðx 1 ; c 1 Þ 6 y 1 if and only if c 1 6 y 1 , hence supfc 1 2 ½0; 1j minðx 1 ; c 1 Þ 6 y 1 g ¼ y 1 . We conclude that I Min ðx; yÞ ¼ ðy 1 ; 0Þ.
• If x 1 > y 1 and x 2 < y 2 , then
Since y 2 L Ã , we may conclude that I Min ðx; yÞ ¼ ðy 1 ; y 2 Þ. To summarize, we obtain:
if x 1 6 y 1 and x 2 P y 2 ð1 À y 2 ; y 2 Þ if x 1 6 y 1 and x 2 < y 2 ðy 1 ; 0Þ if x 1 > y 1 and x 2 P y 2 ðy 1 ; y 2 Þ if x 1 > y 1 and
I Min is an extension of the G€ o odel implicator on ½0; 1, defined by, for x; y 2 ½0; 1:
Example 6. Let Tðx; yÞ ¼ ðmaxð0; x 1 þ y 1 À 1Þ; minð1; x 2 þ y 2 ÞÞ. Then
To find an explicit formula for I T , we distinguish between the following cases:
• If x 1 6 y 1 and x 2 P y 2 , then clearly x 1 þ c 1 À 1 6 y 1 and
• If x 1 6 y 1 and x 2 < y 2 , then still
and x 2 þ c 2 P y 2 is equivalent to c 2 P y 2 À x 2 . Since we also require c 1 þ c 2 6 1, we need to find the supremum (in L Ã ) of the set of ðc 1 ; c 2 ÞÕs that satisfy the following array of inequalities:
ð1Þ It is clear that in each case the supremum of the shaded area is equal to:
In summary we get:
I T is an extension of the Łukasiewicz implicator on ½0; 1 (see Examples 3 and 4).
To find an explicit expression for I T W , let x; y; c 2 L Ã . Then
The last formula holds because c is an element of L Ã . Hence we ob-
Note especially that I T W ¼ I S W ;Ns , and thus it also extends the Łuka-siewicz implicator I a on ½0; 1. This should not come as a surprise since in fuzzy logic the Łukasiewicz implicator is both an R-and an S-implicator.
Miscellaneous implicators and related operators on L Ã outside the previous classes
The phrase ''Implicators and Related Operators on L Ã '' in the title of this subsection owes to the fact that not all the ''implicators'' defined so far within the literature on IFSs and IVFSs meet the criteria set by Definition 6. It is definitely not our goal to produce an exhaustive list of all possible alternatives; we merely quote some of the more interesting examples.
Example 8 (Two alternative extensions of G€ o odel implication). In Example 5, we constructed an R-implicator on L Ã that was an extension of I g , the G€ o odel implicator (itself also an R-implicator) on ½0; 1. Below we outline two alternative generalizations of I g , neither of which is an R-implicator (or an S-implicator, for that matter) on L Ã . The first one was defined in [3] by Atanassov and Gargov as an implication operator for intuitionistic fuzzy logic; in the context of ðL Ã ; 6 L Ã Þ it can be paraphrased as:
Let us start by proving that I ag is not an S-implicator; suppose I ag ðx; yÞ ¼ SðNðxÞ; yÞ for all x; y 2 L Ã , S a t-conorm and N a negator on L Ã . Since SðNðxÞ; 0 L Ã Þ ¼ NðxÞ, we find
But if e.g. y ¼ ð0:1; 0:3Þ, then I ag ðx; yÞ ¼ ð0:1; 0Þ 6 ¼ y. Thus, there does not exist such an S and hence I ag is not an S-implicator. Secondly, suppose that
4 so pr 2 Tðx; gÞ P 1 À x 1 . Similarly, Tðg; xÞ 6 L Ã ðg 1 ; 1 À g 1 Þ, so pr 2 Tðx; gÞ ¼ pr 2 Tðg; xÞ P 1 À g 1 . Thus,
On the other hand, pr 1 Tðx; gÞ 6 minðx 1 ;
The second extension of I g we present here may be considered in some way its most genuine generalization to L Ã . Defined by, for x; y 2 L Ã :
it is however an implicator without a representation as an S-or R-implicator.
To check this, suppose I G ðx; yÞ ¼ SðNðxÞ; yÞ for all x; y 2 L Ã , S a t-conorm and N a negator on L Ã . We find
In that case we find SðNðxÞ; yÞ ¼ Sð0
yÞ, a contradiction. Hence, I G is not an S-implicator. 4 Indeed, since
Suppose on the other hand that I g ðx; yÞ ¼ supfc 2 L Ã jTðx; cÞ 6 L Ã yg for all x; y 2 L Ã , and T a t-norm on L Ã . Choose x; y 2 L Ã n D such that x 1 > y 1 and x 2 P y 2 > 0. Then I g ðx; yÞ ¼ ðy 1 ; y 2 Þ by assumption. On the other hand, I T ðx; yÞ P L Ã I Min ðx; yÞ ¼ ðy 1 ; 0Þ (see Example 5), since Min is the greatest t-norm on L Ã . But ðy 1 ; 0Þ > L Ã ðy 1 ; y 2 Þ, again a contradiction. Hence, I G is no R-implicator either.
Example 9 (Aggregated implicators on L Ã ). In [9] Bustince et al. constructed implication operators for intuitionistic fuzzy logic based on aggregation operators on ½0; 1. Recall that an aggregation operator is a ½0; 1 2 ! ½0; 1 mapping M that satisfies the following conditions:
(1) Mð0; 0Þ ¼ 0 (2) Mð1; 1Þ ¼ 1 (3) M is increasing in its first and in its second argument (4) Mðx; yÞ ¼ Mðy; xÞ for all x; y 2 ½0; 1 They proved that if I is an implicator and N an involutive negator on ½0; 1, and M 1 , M 2 , M 3 , and M 4 are aggregation operators such that M 1 ðx; yÞ þ M 3 ð1 À x; 1 À yÞ P 1 and M 2 ðx; yÞ þ M 4 ð1 À x; 1 À yÞ 6 1 for all x; y 2 ½0; 1, then I defined by, for all x; y 2 L Ã ,
is an implicator on L Ã in the sense of Definition 6. As a simple instance of this class, putting
and I the Kleene-Dienes implicator on ½0; 1, we obtain the S-implicator from Example 2. More interesting implicators emerge when the aggregation operators are chosen strictly between min and max, i.e. minðx; yÞ < M i ðx; yÞ < maxðx; yÞ, for some x; y 2 ½0; 1 and i ¼ 1; . . . ; 4. For instance, putting
for all x; y 2 ½0; 1, we obtain the following implicator I on L Ã :
This implicator has no representation in terms of S-nor R-implicators. Indeed, suppose I B ðx; yÞ ¼ SðNðxÞ; yÞ for all x; y 2 L Ã , S a t-conorm and N a ne-
Þ. Then
On the other hand, SðNðxÞ; yÞ ¼ Sð0 L Ã ; yÞ ¼ y 6 ¼ ð
Þ, a contradiction, so I B cannot be an S-implicator.
Suppose on the other hand that
Þ. Then I B ðx; yÞ ¼ ð
Þ. But I Min ðx; yÞ ¼ 1 L Ã , thus I B ðx; yÞj L Ã I Min ðx; yÞ and hence I B has no representation as an R-implicator. [64] . Since that implicator is neither an S-nor an R-implicator, the Wu implicator on L Ã likewise is not.
We conclude with an example of a mapping that was designated as an intuitionistic fuzzy implicator, but in fact does not meet the criteria of Definition 6. 
It is not decreasing in its first component. Indeed, put x ¼ ð0:6; 0:2Þ, 
Classification of implicators on L*: an algebraic approach
The task of classifying implicators defined within any many-valued extension of classical binary propositional logic essentially comes down to checking how many desirable properties of the original operation are kept by the extended structure. Therefore, regardless of background and goals, inspiration for this process draws primarily from logic, and the notion of a tautology (meaning a formula whose truth value is always 1 L Ã , regardless of the truth values of its constituents), or a weakened version of it, 5 will play an important role in it.
Fuzzy logics, as examples of well-studied many-valued truth structures, have shown how an algebraic treatment--translating desirable properties into algebraic laws (or axioms) to be satisfied, and subsequently tracing the shape an implicator should have in order to satisfy a list of axioms--can shed a systematic and pragmatical light on the subject by providing a yardstick method for ''measuring'' the usefulness of implicators. We pursue this strategy for implicators on L Ã , taking as our point of departure an extended version of the Smets-Magrez axioms and finishing off with an algebraic representation of implicators satisfying the entire axiom list. This strategy is therefore dubbed an ''algebraic approach''.
Axioms of Smets and Magrez
In [55] , Smets and Magrez outlined an axiom scheme for implicators on ½0; 1. They took a number of important tautologies from classical logic, translated them into four algebraic axioms and complemented the scheme with monotonicity (A.1) and continuity (A.6) requirements that emerge naturally when we swap the discrete space {0,1} for the continuum ½0; 1. Smets-Magrez axioms stand as a yardstick to test the suitability of implicators on ½0; 1; it is therefore instructive to generalize them to L Ã : 
. 5 In concreto, we think about the following two possible variations on a tautology:
• Fuzzy tautologies [49] , formulas whose truth values ðx 1 ; x 2 Þ are such that x 1 P 0:5.
• Intuitionistic fuzzy tautologies [3] , formulas whose truth values ðx 1 ; x 2 Þ are such that
Note. In axiom 3, the mapping N I , defined by In what follows, we first conduct a detailed investigation to verify if and under which conditions the implicators of the previous section satisfy the various 
Smets-Magrez axioms for S-and R-implicators on L
Ã
As can be seen from Definition 9, axiom 1 merely asserts the monotonicity conditions incorporated into the definition of implicators on L Ã . It is kept in the list for reasons of tradition, but will not occur in the following discussion. As the following theorem shows, t-representability presents us with an important obstacle in our quest for a Łukasiewicz implicator on L Ã .
S-implicators
Theorem 5. Axiom (A.5) fails for every t-representable S-implicator I S;N on L Ã , provided that N is involutive. Proof. This is obvious by the chaining rule for continuous mappings on the subspace
Proof.
Proof. We only have to verify (A.2). Let x 2 L Ã . We have:
Again, problems emerge w.r.t. t-representability, this time concerning the contrapositivity of the implicator. Proof. Assume that the representants of T are T and S. Let x; y 2 L Ã , and suppose (A.3) holds. Then N I T is involutive. We have:
We also have I T ðx; 0 L Ã Þ ¼ N I T ðxÞ, in other words:
We find:
Since inffc 2 2 ½0; 1jc 2 P 1g ¼ 1, we obtain
which is a contradiction. In other words, (A.3) does not hold. h 
Proof. Assume first that conditions (2) and (3) are fulfilled. We start by proving that
To prove the converse implication,
it follows that X fc 2 L Ã jTðx; cÞ 6 L Ã yg, and so pr 1 Tðx;
Conversely, assume that (A.5) holds. Suppose now that for each sequence 
Ã . Then, since x 1 ¼ supfpr 1 Tðx; cÞjc 2 Xg, there exists a c n 2 X such that x 1 À < pr 1 Tðx; c n Þ 6 x 1 , thus jx 1 À pr 1 Tðx; c n Þj < ¼ Thus we obtain a sequence ðc 00 n Þ n2N
Ã in X such that jc 00 n;1 À 1j þ jc 00 n;2 À 0j 6 2 n and jpr 1 Tðx; c 00 n Þ À x 1 j þ jpr 2 Tðx; c 00 n Þ À x 2 j < 2 n . Clearly lim n!þ1 c 00 n ¼ 1 L Ã and lim n!þ1 Tðx; c 00 n Þ ¼ x, which is in contradiction with our assumption. Hence
In other words, (A.5) is violated, so our assumption that conditions (2) and (3) do not hold was false. h Corollary 10. If T is a t-norm on L Ã such that pr 1 T is a left-continuous ðL Ã Þ 2 ! ½0; 1 mapping and pr 2 T is a right-continuous ðL Ã Þ 2 ! ½0; 1 mapping then I T satisfies (A.5).
Proof. We will prove this result by constructing a sequence meeting the conditions of Theorem 9. From the left-continuity of pr 1 T and the right-continuity of pr 2 T follows for all x; y 2 L Ã [29] : 
In Table 1 , we have summarized the classification results w.r.t. the extended Smets-Magrez axioms. For completeness, apart from S-and R-implicators, we have also included the implicators discussed in Section 3.3. It is left to the reader to verify these properties.
A question unanswered by this table is whether there exist Łukasiewicz implicators on L Ã outside the classes of S-and R-implicators. This and other issues are resolved in the following paragraph.
Representation of model and Łukasiewicz implicators on L
Ã
We have shown, by explicit example, that a Łukasiewicz implicator on L Ã exists. The next question to ask is whether we can capture all of them by a parameterized formula, as was done for implicators on ½0; 1 (see e.g. [46] ). The answer turns out to be largely affirmative, as the following discussion reveals. Proof. We prove the claim for T I . The proof for S I is analogous.
• T I is increasing. This is obvious because I is an implicator and N a negator on L Ã .
• T I is commutative. Indeed, for x; y 2 L Ã , we have: • T I ð1 L Ã ; xÞ ¼ x. Indeed, for x; y 2 L Ã , we have: We now proceed to establish a link between Łukasiewicz implicators on L Ã and R-implicators generated by t-norms satisfying the conditions of Theorem 3. To this aim, a number of lemmas are introduced. Proof. We will prove that (iii) ) (ii) ) (i) ) (iii). First note that since I T satisfies (A.2) and (A.3), N I T is involutive.
• Assume (iii) holds. The following deduction, for all x; y; z 2 L Ã , shows that (ii) holds. • Lastly, assume I T is contrapositive; we prove (iii). Since I T satisfies the residuation principle, we obtain successively, for all x; y; z 2 L Ã :
Tðx; yÞ 6 L Ã z () Tðy; xÞ 6 L Ã z () x 6 L Ã I T ðy; zÞ () x 6 L Ã I T ðNðzÞ; NðyÞÞ () TðNðzÞ; xÞ 6 L Ã NðyÞ () Tðx; NðzÞÞ 6 L Ã NðyÞ
Since from (iii) follows (ii), and using the fact that N is involutive and decreasing, we obtain successively:
Hence from (iii) follows the residuation principle. h Lemma 3. Let T be a t-norm on L Ã satisfying the exchange principle. Then
Proof. From the exchange principle follows Tðx;
Lemma 4 [29] . Let T be a t-norm on L Ã satisfying the residuation principle. Then, for any x; y; z such that Tðx; yÞ ¼ z, there exists an y 0 2 L Ã such that y 0 P L Ã y and Since N I T is an involutive negator, we have that N I T ð0; 0Þ ¼ ð0; 0Þ (see [29] ). Hence I T ðð0; 0Þ; 0 L Ã Þ ¼ ð0; 0Þ and from the residuation principle and Theorem 14 follows that Tðð0; 0Þ; ð0;
xÞ ¼ x. Then, since T is increasing and Tðx; 1 L Ã Þ ¼ x, we obtain Tðx; yÞ ¼ x for all y P L Ã x. In particular Tðx; ðx 1 ; 0ÞÞ ¼ x.
If
Suppose now x 1 > 0. We prove that there exists a sequence ðy n Þ n2N Ã which converges to ðx 1 ; 0Þ and such that, for all n 2 N Ã , y n ¼ ðy n;1 ; 0Þ and y n satisfies Tðx; N I T ðz n ÞÞ ¼ N I T ðy n Þ; where z n ¼ Tðx; y n Þ ð 5Þ
Let n 2 N Ã . Since Tðx; yÞ 6 L Ã y for all y 2 L Ã , we obtain pr 1 Tðx; ðx 1 À 1 n ; 0ÞÞ 6 x 1 À 1 n < x 1 . Since T is increasing, we have Tðx; ðx 1 À 1 n ; 0ÞÞ 6 L Ã Tðx; 1 L Ã Þ ¼ x, so pr 2 Tðx; ðx 1 À 1 n ; 0ÞÞ P x 2 . Hence we obtain Tðx; ðx 1 À 1 n ; 0ÞÞ < L Ã x. From Lemma 4 and Theorem 14 it follows that there exists a y n such that Tðx; y n Þ ¼ Tðx; ðx 1 À 1 n ; 0ÞÞ and y n satisfies (5). Furthermore, from that lemma follows that y n P L Ã ðx 1 À 1 n ; 0Þ, so x 1 À 1 n 6 y n;1 and y n;2 ¼ 0. Since Tðx; y n Þ < L Ã x, it follows that y n j L Ã x, thus y n;1 < x 1 (since y n;2 ¼ 0 6 x 2 ). From this follows that jx 1 À y n;1 j þ j0 À y n;2 j ¼ x 1 À y n;1 6
; hence lim n!þ1 y n ¼ ðx 1 ; 0Þ. Moreover, since T is continuous, we have lim n!þ1 z n ¼ lim n!þ1 Tðx; y n Þ ¼ Tðx; ðx 1 ; 0ÞÞ ¼ x. From the involutivity (and hence the continuity) of N follows that lim n!þ1 N I T ðz n Þ ¼ N I T ðxÞ, and lim n!þ1 N I T ðy n Þ ¼ N I T ðx 1 ; 0Þ. Since y n satisfies (5), we obtain N I T ðx 1 ; 0Þ ¼ lim n!þ1 Nðy n Þ ¼ lim n!þ1 Tðx; N I T ðz n ÞÞ ¼ Tðx; N I T ðxÞÞ ¼ 0 L Ã , using the continuity of T and Lemma 3. Hence ðx 1 ; 0Þ ¼ 1 L Ã , which is a contradiction to our assumption that x 6 ¼ 1 L Ã .
• T is strong nilpotent.
From Lemma 3 follows Tðx; Proof. Let T be a continuous t-norm on L Ã satisfying the residuation principle and TðD; DÞ D. If I T is contrapositive, then, by Theorem 14, T satisfies the exchange principle. By Lemma 3 and Theorem 3,
where we used the fact that T W satisfies the residuation principle, and that U and U À1 are increasing permutations. We easily obtain that
On the other hand, suppose T ¼ U À1 T W ðU pr 1 ; U pr 2 Þ. I T can only be contrapositive w.r.t. its induced negator N ¼ N I T , defined by Proof. Since any model implicator on L Ã is an S-implicator, we know that
hence NðxÞ 6 L Ã Sðy; zÞ () NðyÞ 6 L Ã Sðx; zÞ. By changing the variable names as z ! x, y ! y and x ! NðzÞ, we obtain z 6 L Ã Sðx; yÞ () NðyÞ 6 L Ã Sðx; NðzÞÞ ð6Þ
Let T be the dual t-norm of S w.r.t. N, i.e. Tðx; yÞ ¼ NðSðNðxÞ; NðyÞÞÞ for all x; y 2 L Ã . Then (6) is equivalent to z 6 L Ã NðTðNðxÞ; NðyÞÞÞ () NðyÞ 6 L Ã NðTðNðxÞ; zÞÞ. Since N is involutive and decreasing, this yields NðzÞ P L Ã TðNðxÞ; NðyÞÞ () y P L Ã TðNðxÞ; zÞ. By substituting the variable names as x ! NðxÞ, y ! NðyÞ and z ! NðzÞ, we obtain Tðx; yÞ 6 L Ã z () Tðx; NðzÞÞ 6 L Ã NðyÞ ð 7Þ
From Theorem 14 follows that the R-implicator I T generated by T satisfies I T ðx; yÞ ¼ NðTðx; NðyÞÞÞ for all x; y 2 L Ã . Hence I T ðx; yÞ ¼ NðTðx; NðyÞÞÞ ¼ NðTðNðNðxÞÞ; NðyÞÞÞ ¼ SðNðxÞ; yÞ ¼ I S;N ðx; yÞ ¼ Iðx; yÞ for all x; y 2 L Ã . Since I and N are continuous, so are S and T. Since IðD; DÞ D and NðDÞ D for all x; y 2 D it holds that Sðx; yÞ ¼ I S;N ðNðxÞ; yÞ ¼ IðNðxÞ; yÞ 2 D. So we obtain that for all x; y 2 D it holds that Tðx; yÞ ¼ NðSðNðxÞ; NðyÞÞÞ 2 D, i.e. TðD; DÞ D. From Theorems 14 and 15 follows that there exists a continous increasing permutation
is increasing and such that I ¼ U À1 I T W ðU pr 1 ; U pr 2 Þ. h
In [29] it is shown that if U is a continuous, increasing permutation of L Ã such that U À1 is also increasing, then there exists a continuous, increasing permutation u of ½0; 1 such that UðxÞ ¼ ðuðx 1 Þ; 1 À uð1 À x 2 ÞÞ for all x 2 L Ã . It follows that if I is a Łukasiewicz implicator on L Ã such that IðD; DÞ D, then there exists an increasing permutation u of L Ã such that, for all x; y 2 L Ã ,
Clearly, I is decreasing in its first and increasing in its second component, since u and u À1 are increasing.
À uðx 1 ÞÞÞ, using the fact that x 1 6 1 À x 2 and u is increasing. We obtain IðNðyÞ; NðxÞÞ ¼ ðu
We have Iðx; Iðy; zÞÞ ¼ ðu
ÞÞÞ, which is symmetrical in x and y and thus equal to Iðy; Iðx; zÞÞ. So (A.4) holds.
Furthermore, Iðx; yÞ ¼ ðu
ÞÞ ¼ 1 and minð1; 1 À uðx 1 Þ þ uð1 À y 2 ÞÞ ¼ 1 () uðy 1 Þ P uðx 1 Þ and uð1 À y 2 Þ P uð1 À x 2 Þ and uð1 À y 2 Þ P uðx 1 Þ () y 1 P x 1 and 1 À y 2 P 1 À x 2 and 1 À y 2 P x 1 () y 1 P x 1 and y 2 6 x 2 () x 6 L Ã y using the fact that u is an increasing permutation. Hence I satisfies (A.5).
Since u is a continuous increasing permutation of ½0; 1, u À1 is also continuous. It follows easily that I is continuous and hence satisfies (A.6). h
The following theorem summarizes the results of this subsection: 
Open problem. Does there exist a Łukasiewicz implicator such that IðD; DÞ* D?
Note. We wish to stress that the axioms imposed by Smets and Magrez are by no means the only interesting ones for implicators. For instance, Gargov and Atanassov [3] enforced the following distributivity condition on I:
ð8x; y; z 2 L Ã ÞðIðx; Iðy; zÞÞ ¼ IðIðx; yÞ; Iðx; zÞÞÞ ð8Þ
Łukasiewicz implicators do not satisfy it, while I ag from Example 4 does. So if (8) is needed, I ag is obviously a better option, yet one should realize that it is not contrapositive.
Links with residuated lattices and MV-algebras
It is well-known that classical logic can be described by a boolean algebra. In order to have more than two values for the evaluation of formulas, there have been many attempts to generalize this traditional structure. In this context, residuated lattices and MV-algebras take a particularly distinguished role (see e.g. [38, 52, 53, 62] ). The aim of this paragraph is to embed the classification results established above into these general algebraic frameworks for logical calculi.
Definition 12 (Residuated lattice). An algebraic structure L ¼ ðL;^; _; ; !; 0; 1Þ is called a residuated lattice provided • ðL;^; _Þ is a bounded lattice with ordering 6 L and 0 and 1 as its smallest and greatest element, respectively;
2 ! L mapping such that for all x; y; z 2 L holds:
From this definition and our previous discussion, it is obvious that ðL Ã ; Min; Max; T; I T ; 0 L Ã ; 1 L Ã Þ is a residuated lattice if and only if T is a triangular norm on L Ã that satisfies the residuation principle. As a noteworthy example, Łukasiewicz implicators I such that IðD; DÞ D (which are always R-implicators generated by a t-norm T satisfying the residuation principle, cf. Theorem 16) can be used to construct instances of residuated lattices. We denote them by L I .
H€ o ohle introduced the concept of a square root [39] function of a residuated lattice. Concretely, given the residuated lattice L ¼ ðL;^; _; ; !; 0; 1Þ, an L ! L mapping ffiffi ffi p is called square root function of L if for every x; y 2 L the following conditions hold:
For the residuated lattice ð½0; 1; min; max; T W ; I a ; 0; 1Þ a square root function exists [52] . It is therefore worthwhile to examine whether this operation is still definable for its extension, the residuated lattice L I T W . The answer turns out to be negative. In [10] , Chang defined a stronger version of a residuated lattice called an MV-algebra. We will not reproduce ChangÕs original, lengthy definition here, but instead define the notion by a characterization in terms of residuated lattices [52] .
Definition 13 (MV-algebra). An MV-algebra is a residuated lattice ðL;^; _; ; !; 0; 1Þ such that the following condition is fulfilled, for all x; y 2 L:
Again the question arises whether the extension L I T W of (½0; 1,min, max,T W ,I a ,0,1) inherits the property of being an MV-algebra. A simple counterexample shows that it does not. Indeed, let x ¼ À Á . So, whereas the SmetsMagrez axioms can be maintained under the extension to L Ã , the property of being an MV-algebra is lost. A stronger result can be proven using H€ o ohleÕs claim [40] that an infinite, locally finite, 6 complete 7 MV-algebra is necessarily isomorphic with (½0; 1,min,max,T W ,I a ,0,1):
is locally finite, and T is continuous, then L is no MV-algebra.
Proof. If L is an MV-algebra, then I T must be contrapositive [52] . From Theorem 14, we derive that T satisfies the exchange principle, and thus by Lemma 7 and the continuity of T, T is archimedean. Since no isomorphism exists between ½0; 1 and L Ã , the proof is complete provided L is locally finite. h
Intuitionistic fuzzy and interval-valued implicators: applications, opportunities, challenges
During the past two decades, fuzzy implicators have played an increasingly prominent role within the research focused on fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic. Fuzzy implicators have been shown useful in rule-based (expert) systems, for defining inclusion measures and measures of guaranteed possibility and necessity, for characterizing fuzzy rough sets and linguistic modifiers, for pattern classification, aggregation, preference modelling and decision making, fuzzy logic programming and many other fields.
Our goal in these pages is not to go into the details of generalizing all or even any of these application domains; let it suffice to mention that a lot of work in that direction has already been done in both the interval computations (see e.g. [11, 12, 37, 43, 44, 47, 51] ) and intuitionistic fuzzy set theory communities (see e.g. [4, 7, 8, 20, 21, 50, 56] ). Rather we aim to provide some basic insight of (a) the usefulness and (b) the flexibility of calculation obtained by our lattice-valued approach to implicators, and to outline some challenges and opportunities that future research in this area could face. As a running example throughout this section, we take the well-known generalized modus ponens (GMP) inference rule [12, 24, 17] , which reads:
6 An MV-algebra ðL;^; _; ; !; 0; 1Þ is called locally finite if to every x 2 L n f1g, there exists an n 2 N such that It is important to mark the difference with the analogous situation in fuzzy set theory, where left-continuity of a t-norm T on ½0; 1 sufficed to extend the modus ponens if the associated R-implicator was used. In [29] , however, a continuous t-norm on L Ã was constructed that does not satisfy equality (9) . In the next two subsections, we will come back to the GMP example to illustrate the incorporation of uncertainty by means of IFSs and IVFSs into knowledge-manipulating processes.
Propagation of uncertainty in L Ã -fuzzy sets
It has been mentioned in the introduction that fuzzy sets are unable to deal adequately with uncertainty. In this light, a degree of non-determinacy p was introduced. In this paragraph, we will treat p as a mapping from
The mapping p has the interesting feature that it allows us to focus exclusively on uncertainty: controlling the propagation of uncertainty in the GMP example will be tantamount to controlling the values pðxÞ for the membership degrees x to the result L Ã -fuzzy set B 0 . In this sense, we lend a willing ear to the constraints imposed on the implicator I by Bustince et al. in [9] , for x; y 2 L Ã :
B:1 pðIðx; yÞÞ 6 maxð1 À x 1 ; 1 À y 1 Þ B:2 x ¼ y ) pðIðx; yÞÞ ¼ pðxÞ B:3 pðxÞ ¼ pðyÞ ) pðIðx; yÞÞ ¼ pðxÞ
The first constraint is aimed at establishing upper bounds for the uncertainty caused by an application of an implicator. The following easy deduction shows that criterion (B.1) is satisfied by all Łukasiewicz implicators, and more generally by all S-implicators I S;N on L Ã generated by arbitrary involutive N and S, by a very comfortable margin: pðIðx; yÞÞ ¼ 1 À pr 1 ðSðNðxÞ; yÞÞ À pr 2 ðSðNðxÞ; yÞÞ 6 1 À pr 1 ðSðNðxÞ; yÞÞ ¼ 1 À pr 1 ðSððN ð1 À x 2 Þ; 1 À N ðx 1 ÞÞ; yÞÞ
where we used the representation Theorem 1 for N by the fuzzy negator N . Obviously, the one but last line of the above deduction offers a tighter criterion that we propose to replace the right hand side of (B.1) with; it will be hard to prove compliance with stronger restrictions since lower bounds on IÕs second projection are difficult to obtain in general.
The remaining conditions address another issue, namely the conservation of uncertainty through the application of an implicator on L Ã . Despite their fairness from an intuitive perspective, they conflict with the requirement imposed by logic that Iðx; xÞ
Ã , an immediate consequence of axiom (A.5); Łukasiewicz implicators therefore never satisfy (B.2) nor (B.3); the implicator from Example 2 on the other hand does.
The above observation appears to point out an intuitive anomaly, namely that uncertainty can disappear entirely through the application of an implicator on L Ã . Although this important debate on the apparent clash between logical and cognitive assumptions needs to be pursued further and in full depth, our feeling is that a decision to comply with (B.2) and/or (B.3) should depend primarily on the application at hand, and so the conditions are not absolute. For instance, in determining the degree of inclusion of fuzzy sets into one another, sometimes the formula [26] IncðA; BÞ ¼ inf u2U IðAðuÞ; BðuÞÞ is used, where A and B are fuzzy sets in U and I is an implicator on ½0; 1. Suppose we replace I by an implicator I on L Ã and generalize A; B to arbitrary L Ã -fuzzy sets. Naturally, IncðA; BÞ should be equal to 1 if and only if A B, that is ð8u 2 U ÞðAðuÞ 6 L Ã BðuÞÞ. Hence I should satisfy (A.5). This material is studied in detail in [25] .
In the GMP example, there do not seem to be any arguments in favour of (B.2) and (B.3) either. A more relevant criterion is the following: Unfortunately, with the current machinery of Łukasiewicz implicators, the latter inequality seems very difficult to realize. The main problem is that there is no direct correlation between p and the ordering in L Ã , so that even when x 6 L Ã y, all three options: pðxÞ ¼ pðyÞ, pðxÞ > pðyÞ, pðxÞ < pðyÞ are still possible. We postpone the algebraic investigation of this property to a future paper, remarking that the criterion is trivially met if there is no uncertainty in the ifthen rule (IðAðuÞ; BðvÞÞ 2 D for all ðu; vÞ 2 U Â V ). This section identified one index of uncertainty associated with L Ã -fuzzy sets; in the next subsection we fit these ideas into a larger framework focussed on dealing with imprecise knowledge.
A view of uncertainty inspired by intuitionistic fuzzy possibility theory
In [18, 19, 22] , an intuitionistic fuzzy extension of possibility theory (in the sense of Zadeh [68] ) was proposed. We briefly recall the main ideas. 9 The central notion in possibility theory is that of a so-called elastic restriction that allows us to discriminate between the more or less plausible values for a variable X in a universe U . In this sense, it reflects our uncertainty about the true value of X . This elastic restriction is modelled by a mapping p X from U to a set L, whose values represent degrees of possibility, so that p X ðuÞ ¼ l means that it is possible to degree l 2 L that X takes the value u 2 U . Yet, typically a mix of positive and negative evidence contributes to our knowledge about X ; positive evidence here means that we get information that particular values are to a given extent possible for X , while negative evidence includes those statements that tell us something about the necessity that X cannot in fact take a particular value. 10 It therefore appears counterintuitive to let this kind of information be represented by a single degree (of possibility) for every element in the universe, thereby enforcing implicit duality of the degree of necessity. Indeed, in traditional possibility theory, where L ¼ ½0; 1, two measures of possibility and necessity of a crisp set A in U are defined:
Obviously, N X ðAÞ ¼ 1 À P X ðcoðAÞÞ, where coðAÞ represents the complement of A. It makes more sense to have two separate distributions that define the degree of possibility that X ¼ u and the degree of necessity that X 6 ¼ u, respectively. In [22] we suggested to use the membership and non-membership functions of an intuitionistic fuzzy set for that purpose, such that formally L ¼ L Ã . The resulting distribution p X was called an intuitionistic fuzzy possibility distribution. The altered measures of possibility and necessity now read: They satisfy a weakened duality, i.e. N X ðAÞ 6 1 À P X ðcoðAÞÞ, embodying the cognitive constraint that our belief (necessity) that X 6 ¼ u cannot surpass one minus the possibility that X ¼ u. 1 À P X ðAÞ À N X ðAÞ can be used to model disbelief in (unreliability of) the observer that provided the information.
Let us consider this interpretation in the framework of our GMP example. A, A 0 , B and B 0 will all represent possibility distributions on their associated variables. Let us assume at this moment that there is no uncertainty present in the if-then rule, so AðuÞ 2 D and BðvÞ 2 D for all u 2 U and v 2 V . An interesting situation to study is one in which we completely discredit the observer, that is pr 2 ðA 0 ðuÞÞ ¼ 0 for all u 2 U . An obvious constraint to impose, then, is the non-credibility of the result: pr 2 ðB 0 ðvÞÞ ¼ 0 for all v 2 V , since we do not want to be forced to make any commitment due to an unreliable observer. In general, we could ask how the uncertainty associated with the observer should be reflected in the result. It is important to note that the discussion on the propagation of p-values from the previous subsection does not apply here, because A 0 and B 0 are (usually) associated with different variables X and Y . It appears that the CRI already takes care of variations in the possibility distribution associated with X ; by enforcing its semantics of inferring the most specific distribution on Y consistent with the constraints on X and Y , it puts bounds on the reliability of the result, expressed by pr 2 ðB 0 Þ. Experiments will have to reveal whether this belief is justified, and whether the CRI indeed operates in accordance with our expectations on the propagation of more or less reliable information.
Other challenges and future work
In this short concluding paragraph, we list a few areas in which further work and/or experiment is mandatory, along with appropriate questions to ask.
• Jenei [41] studied continuity w.r.t. to different metrics in the GMP for a particular subclass of fuzzy quantities (fuzzy sets in R). His results favoured the Łukasiewicz implicators on ½0; 1. Does this observation extend to L Ã ? • Atanassov and Gargov [3, 5] proposed to replace the classical notion of a tautology with that of an intuitionistic fuzzy tautology (IFT). A formula P is called an IFT if its truth value x 2 L Ã is such that x 1 P x 2 . Not every IFT is necessarily also a classical tautology. For instance, for the implicator I Max;Ns in Example 2, the formula Iðx; xÞ ¼ 1 L Ã is not a tautology, but is an IFT since maxðx 2 ; x 1 Þ P minðx 1 ; x 2 ÞÞ. IFTs may allow Bustince et al.Õs criteria to coexist with a modified version of the Smets-Magrez axioms. This direction has yet to be explored in full depth. Related to this is Kenevan and NeapolitanÕs [44] , and later EntemannÕs [33] work on a logic with interval truth values along with a proof theory for it. It was shown that this logic is ''fuzzy complete'', that is: all fuzzy tautologies, i.e. formulas P such that their truth value x 2 L Ã satisfies x 1 P 0:5, can be proven in the theory. The question then arises whether we could develop something like ''intuitionistic fuzzy completeness''.
• IVFSs and IFSs can both be considered as stepping stones in a larger context: IVFSs are characterized by membership degrees which are intervals in ½0; 1. Going one step further, type-2 fuzzy sets emerge when we allow membership degrees themselves to be fuzzy sets in ½0; 1. They have been receiving a lot of renewed attention lately, amongst others by Mendel [47] and T€ u urks ßen [61] , as a vehicle particularly suited to implementing the computing with words (CWW) paradigm. It is worthwhile to further investigate the algebraic structure on which type-2 fuzzy sets are defined. In this sense the theorem by Mizumoto and Tanaka [48] that convex and normalized type-2 fuzzy sets give way to a bounded lattice is very important. IFS theory, which is specifically tuned to the concept of positive (membership) and negative (non-membership) constituents, can be generalized by dropping the restriction that l þ m 6 1, and by instead drawing ðl; mÞ from ½0; 1 2 . This extension was coined quadrivalent (i.e. four-valued) fuzzy logic and was studied e.g. in [13, 34] .
Conclusion
We have constructed a representation theorem for Łukasiewicz implicators on the lattice L Ã which serves as the underlying algebraic structure for both intuitionistic fuzzy and interval-valued fuzzy sets. We have related our results to the general theory of residuated lattices and MV-algebras, and explained how to apply them in a practical context to model of different kinds of imprecision.
